From *Grand* Modernity to *Petit* Modernity

There is a dual narrative that is often taken to be characteristic of modernity: the first is the idea of its unique Europeanness, and the second is its translatability into non-European cultures. This narrative argues for the mutability of modernity, thus permitting its export and enhancing its universal character while putting a European epistemological stamp on its subsequent reception. The traveling character of this dimension of modernity as export understands modernity as emerging from Europe, say, from the mid-fifteenth century, and slowly spreading outward like a million points of light into the patches of darkness that lie outside its foundational center. Modernity in this guise was projected as an instrument of progress. The guiding concepts often associated with it—instrumental rationality, the development of capitalism—emerged in the debate between theological and scientific reason. These concepts also provided the foundation for the Renaissance and Enlightenment in Europe, in which feudalism and theo-
logical absolutism—two structures of power and domination that marked the Middle Ages—collapsed. Scientific rationality and individual property, which formed the basis of capital accumulation, were triumphant. The collapse of feudalism and theological absolutism shifted the scales of sovereign power from the theological to the secular.

The chief principles of secularism—individual liberty, political sovereignty, democratic forms of governance, capitalism, and so on—defined its universal character and furnished its master narrative. Thus emerged the European model, appropriate not only for its own diverse societies but also for other societies and civilizations throughout the world. Most important, the export of European modernity became not only a justification for but a principal part of global imperialism. Among serious critics, the master narrative made the claims of universality susceptible to epistemological and historical distortion when deployed in the service of European imperialism. There is good reason for the criticism. Some historians on the Right, such as Niall Ferguson, have argued that modern European imperialism, specifically that of the British Empire, was actually a good thing, not to be regretted, as it bestowed a semblance of modernity on those privileged enough to have been recipients of the empire’s civilizing zeal. So, on the one hand, there is grand modernity in all its European manifestations in reason and progress, and, on the other, is what could be called petit modernity, which represents the export kind, a sort of quotation, which some would go so far as to designate a mimic modernity through its various European references.

It is this relation between grand and petit modernity that has contributed to the widespread search for facilities of modernity that represent what the Indian Marxist historian Dipesh Chakrabarty would call modernity’s heterotemporal history. Chakrabarty argues that the various scenes of modernity observed from the point of view of a heterotemporal composition of history reveals the extent to which experiences of modernity are imbued with the particularities of each given locale, therefore deregulating any idea of one dominant universalism of historical experience. Such experiences, he argues, are structured within specific epistemological conditions that take into account diverse modes of social identity and discourse. Throughout the twentieth century, all across the world, diverse cultural contexts made adapting or translating modernity into specific local variants a path toward modernization by acquiring the accoutrements of a modern society. Because of colonial experience, this resulted in what could be referred to
as grand modernity writ small in cultures—Chakrabarty’s case study was. India—perceived to be in historical transition from colonialism to postcolonialism. In comparing different types of modernity and in our attempts to describe their different characteristics, we are constantly confronted with the persistent tension between grand and petit modernity. How can this tension be resolved? How can the fundamental historical experiences and the particularities of locale that attend them be reconciled or even compared? All recent attempts to make sense of modernity and bend it toward the multiply situated petit modernities—again Chakrabarty would have called these provincialities—are premised on finding a way to render the divergent experiences and uses of modernity, namely, the necessity to historicize and ground them in traditions of thought and practice.

Forms of Transformation: Modernity as Metalanguage

To historicize modernity is not only to ground it within the conditions of social, political, and economic life, it is also to recognize it as a metalanguage with which cultural systems become codified and gain modern legitimation. The idea of modernity as a metalanguage has been particularly acute for me over the past year. To travel in China and South Korea recently is to encounter this metalanguage in action and in many guises. All around cities such as Seoul, Busan, Shanghai, Beijing, Chengdu, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Taipei, the clatter of machinery erecting impressive infrastructures sounded like the drill of the Morse code typing out the metalanguage of modernization. These structures—from museums, opera houses, and theaters to stadiums, sports centers, high-speed train lines, airports, stock exchanges, shopping malls, and luxury apartments—bring alive brand-new urban conditions and cultural spheres that were not remotely imaginable a generation ago. The cities of East Asia have become the playground of global architects enjoying the patronage of both public and private developers.

Underscoring the experiences of these trips is an observation of the scale of growth of the contemporary art world: artists, galleries, collectors, exhibition spaces, museums, and art fairs all are making their way to Beijing and Shanghai. In China alone, the restless imagination and ambition shaping the landscape of contemporary art is breathtaking. Along with this shift, especially among intellectuals and artists, a reverse phenomenon of migration is occurring, namely, the relocation to an Asian context from
which many of them had emigrated years before. Yet not only are the infra-
structures of the state and private speculation being revived, but the artistic
and intellectual cultures of many cities are being remapped. New centers
are emerging, but rather than cultural and intellectual capital being con-
centrated in a limited number of cities, it is being dispersed in many cities
as the reverse migration of ideas continues to explode and expand the cul-
tural parameters of new China and South Korea.

The Bazaar or World’s Fair of Modernization

Of course, the economies of China and South Korea—along with their mod-
ernization, both in depth and in breadth—pale in comparison to Japan’s,
the immediate East Asian reference that lies equidistant to its two newly
modernizing neighbors. Both China and South Korea’s financial strengths
derive from massive export economies. China, of course, is known as the
factory of the world, a designation made possible by the fact that its facto-
ries are disproportionately the production centers of cheap global consumer
goods that have transformed “Made in China” into a brand of global com-
merce. South Korea’s industrial power, on the other hand, is characterized
by a focus on advanced technology and heavy industry. Each of these two
countries has built up its infrastructure through the combination of grand
and petit modernities, bringing together successful models from both East
and West. That is, they are both undergoing modernization based on the
acquisition of instruments and institutions of Western modernity (I mean
this in a superficial sense) within a relatively short period of time, yet with-
out the wholesale discarding of local values that modify the importations.

The ongoing, large-scale process of modernization in China and South
Korea underscores part of the energy, excitement, and sense of newness
coursing through the various strata of each country, making them contem-
porary emblems of a new modernity. Traveling in Europe, on the other
hand, conveys no such sense of energy, excitement, or newness. Europe
feels old and dour in its majestic petrifaction. In fact, many European cities
feel less like part of our time. With their miles of imperious ceremonial
architecture and in the quaintness of the narrow, tourist-friendly cobble-
stoned streets, walking through these cities feels like being in a museum
of modernity. The museumification of Europe is in fact the intention: the
display of heritage, historical glory, and dead past. Preservationists of this
heritage and glory play the role of morticians of modernity.
In contrast, ancient cities like Beijing and Hangzhou—in a country that possesses a very old civilization and society—feel nothing like museums. In modern Chinese cities where vestiges of the past exist, they tend to be peripheral rather than central. These cities, if anything, could be likened to temporary exhibitions of city making, a succession of dizzying obsolescence, a bazaar or world’s fair of modernization. The cities’ skylines are full of glass boxes crowned with the pitched green roofs of classical Chinese pagodas. This hybridization may appear absurd to us now, until we remember that, not too long ago, postmodern architecture in the West was busily inventing these trumped-up styles of the classical and the modern based on a similarly invented autochthonous Western past. Like latter-day biennales, Chinese cities are theaters of the grand statement, many of which have no other purpose than to impress and inspire awe. This has been achieved by what some have argued as indiscriminate modernization and urbanization schemes that have erased much of the cultural heritage of old China, sweeping out and destroying many old neighborhoods and putting in their place unremarkable architecture.\(^3\) Chinese bureaucrats, urban planners, and developers, like modern Baron Hausmanns, are simply unsympathetic to any idea that cities such as Beijing need to be historicized or museified. Modernity is a continuous project. Its principal features, they may reason, are at best contingent. By this conjecture, I want to seek out what is currently at play in the relations of discourse in which the particularities or provincialities—I take this to mean the conditions and situations that generate them—of modernity are situated through the practice, production, dissemination, and reception of contemporary art, far from any claims to a grand heritage or an arriviste, mimic petit translation.

The Altermodern and Habitations of Contemporary Art

If the current spate of modernization in China effectively lays waste to heritage and historical glory and instead emphasizes contingency, might it not be reasonable to argue for the nonuniversal nature of modernity as such? This certainly would be true when applied to contemporary art. We are constantly entertained and exercised in equal measure by the notion that there is no red line running from modernism to contemporary art. For the pedagogues of the existence of such lineage; the chief emblem of this unbroken narrative can be found in the attention given to the procedures and ideas of the Western historical avant-gardes by contemporary artists. On the other
hand, I take the view of this claim, pace Chakrabarty; as a provincial account
of the complexity of contemporary art. To understand its various vectors,
we need then to provincialize modernism. There is no single lineage of mod-
ernism or, for that matter, of contemporary art. Looking for an equivalent
of an Andy Warhol in Mao's China is to be seriously blind to the fact that
China of the pop art era had neither a consumer society nor a capitalist
structure, two things that were instrumentalized in Warhol's critique and
usage of its images. In that sense, pop art would be anathema to the revolu-
tionary program—and, one might even claim, to the avant-garde imagina-
tion—of such a period in China that coincides with the condition and situa-
tion that fostered Warhol's analytical excavation of American mass media
and consumer culture. But the absence of pop art in China in the 1960s
is not the same as the absence of "progressive" contemporary Chinese art
during that period, even if such contemporary art may have been subdued
by the aggressive destruction of the Cultural Revolution.

If we are to make sense of contemporary art during this period in China
and the United States, then we have to wield the heterotemporal tools of his-
tory writing; in so doing, we will see how differently situated American and
Chinese artists were at this time. Despite the importance of globalization
in mediating the recent accounts of contemporary art—a world in which
artists such as Huang Yong Ping, Zhang Huan, Xu Bing, Matthew Barney,
Andreas Gursky, and Jeff Koons, for instance, are contemporaries—we can
apply the same mode of argument against any uniform or unifocal view of
artistic practice today. When Huang Yong Ping, in the work A History of Chi-
inese Painting and a Concise History of Modern Painting in a Washing Machine
for Two Minutes (1987), washed two art historical texts—A History of Chinese
Painting, by Wang Bornin, and one of the first books of Western art history
published in China, Herbert Read's A Concise History of Modern Painting—
in a washing machine, the result is a mound of pulped ideology, a history
of hybridization rather than universalism. If we apply the same lens, say,
to the work of Nigerian artist Yinka Shonibare working in London, we will
again see how he has made the tension between histories, narratives, and
the mythologies of modernity, identity, and subjectivity important ingre-
dients in his continuous attempts to deconstruct the invention of an Afri-
can tradition by imperialism. The locus of Shonibare's theatrical and some-
times treacly installations is the fiction of the African fabric he employs.
These fabrics and their busy patterns and vivid colors are often taken to be
an authentic symbol of an African past. They are, in fact, products of colo-
nial economic transactions that moved from Indonesia to the factories of England and the Netherlands, to the markets of western, eastern, and central Africa, and ultimately to Brixton, London. These artists inhabit the provincialities of modernity and have incisively traced diverse paths of modernity through them. By examining these different locales of practice, as well as the historical experiences that inform them, we learn a lot more about the contingent conditions of modernity than about its universalism. Here again, Chakrabarty offers a useful framework by dint of what he refers to as "habitations of modernity."

What could these habitations of modernity be? On what maps do they appear, and in what forms and shapes? The search for the habitations of modernity seems to me the crux of the Altermodern, the subject of the 2009 Tate Triennial exhibition and the accompanying discursive projects organized by Nicolas Bourriaud, its curator. In his outline to the Altermodern project, Bourriaud lays out an intellectual and cultural itinerary, a jagged map of simultaneity and discontinuity, overlapping narratives and contiguous sites of production that form the basis of contemporary art practice globally. The chief claim of the Altermodern project is simple: to discover the current habitations of contemporary practice. Thus the altermodern proposes the rejection of rigid structures put in place by a stubborn and implacable modernity and the modernist ideal of artistic autonomy. In the same way, it manifests a rebellion against the systematization of artistic production based on a singular, universalized conception of artistic paradigms. If there is anything that marks the path of the altermodern, it would be the provincialities of contemporary art practice today—that is, the degree to which these practices, however globalized they may appear, are also informed by specific epistemological models and aesthetic conditions. Within this scheme, Bourriaud sets out to inquire for us the unfolding of the diverse fields of contemporary art practice that have been unsettled by global links. More important, these practices are measured against the totalizing principles of grand modernity.

At the core of the altermodern's jagged map is its description of what Bourriaud refers to as the "offshore" location of contemporary art practice. However, I will foreground the location of these contemporary practices as indicative of a drive toward an off-center principle, namely, the multifocal, multilocal, heterotemporal, and dispersed structures around which contemporary art is often organized and convened. This multiply located off-center—which might not be analogous to Bourriaud's notion of offshore-
based production—is not the same as the logic of decentered locations. Rather, the off-center is structured by the simultaneous existence of multiple centers. In this way, rather than being the decentering of the universal or the relocation of the center of contemporary art, as the notion of the offshore suggests, it becomes instead the emergence of multiplicity, the breakdown of cultural or locational hierarchies, the absence of a singular locus or a limited number of centers.

**Toward the Excentric: Postcoloniality, Postmodernity, and the Altermodern**

To a large extent, the discursive feature of the Altermodern project seems to return to earlier debates that shaped postcolonial and postmodernist critiques of modernity and the aesthetic principle of the universal. At the same time, theorists of postmodernity and postcoloniality launched an attack on modernism’s focus on a unifocal rather than dialogic modernity. Embracing these critiques, Bourriaud’s project sets out to explore the excentric and dialogic nature of art today, including its scattered trajectories and multiple temporalities, by questioning and provincializing the idea of the center, by decentering its imaginary. Yet this excentric dimension of modern and contemporary art is not necessarily a rejection of modernity and modernism; rather, it articulates the shift to off-center structures of production and dissemination, the dispersal of the universal, the refusal of the monolithic, a rebellion against monoculturalism. In this way, what the altermodern proposes is a rephrasing of prior arguments: The objective is to propose a new terminology, one that could succinctly capture both the emergence of multiple cultural fields as they spill into diverse arenas of thinking and practice and a reconceptualization of the structures of legitimation that follow in their wake. In his text, Bourriaud makes concrete what he sees as the field of the Altermodern, describing his model as

an attempt to redefine modernity in the era of globalization. A state of mind more than a “movement,” the Altermodern goes against cultural standardization and massification on one hand, against nationalisms and cultural relativism on the other, by positioning itself within the world cultural gaps, putting translation, wandering and culture-crossings at the centre of art production. Offshore-based, it forms clusters and archipelagos of thought against the continental “mainstream”: the altermodern artist produces links between signs far away
from each other, explores the past and the present to create original paths.

Envisioning time as a multiplicity rather than as a linear progress, the altermodern artist considers the past as a territory to explore, and navigates throughout history as well as all the planetary time zones. Altermodern is heterochronical. Formally speaking, altermodern art privileges processes and dynamic forms to unidimensional single objects, trajectories to static masses.9

The Offshore, Off-Center, and Procedures of Relation

The formulation of the altermodern reflects precisely Édouard Glissant’s theory of the “poetics of relation,” an idea predicated on linkages and networks of relations rather than on a focal point of practice.10 Bourriaud’s idea of the altermodern addresses the cultural geography of relations of discourse and practice. He rightly reads contemporary art as that which always exceeds the borders of spatial confinement, beyond the limited geography of the nation and its totalized identity. The altermodern is structured around trajectories, connections, time zones: heterochronical pathways. Such relations suggest that the project is strongly in accord with a large corpus of scholarship and literature that has made conceiving an alternate system for evaluating modernity, one in which the off-center contexts of contemporary art are a core intellectual principle. But have not the practices of art always been predicated on trajectories and detours, on dynamic forms and modes of production and dissemination? Is the role of contemporary art not always the constant refusal of orthodoxy—to display attentive vigilance against closure; to challenge all doctrinaire, unitary discourses on which some of the most powerful theses of classical modernism rest?

While Bourriaud identifies the shift in recent art as the desire to mobilize new localities of production, which he perceives today as proper to the field of artistic practice, a related field of historical research (as I have noted) has been examining the dimension of the off-center principle of art historical discourse for some time. The result of these research projects is slowly entering mainstream art historical production. In the last decade, several scholars have explored the structure of the heterochronical conception of modern and contemporary art history.

One such project is a recent exhibition, Turns in Tropics: Artist-Curator, developed for the seventh Gwangju Biennale by the Manila-based Filipino
art historian and curator Patrick Flores. In his exhibition project, he proposes an agenda of experimental and conceptualist practices from the late 1960s to early 1980s in Southeast Asia by four artists working in contexts in which the spirit of modernity was not only transforming the splintered identity of the nation, but rapid modernization was also recalibrating the canons and languages of artistic practice. Flores’s emphasis of location represents a distinct cultural ecology, as it were, a habitation of modernity. His research explores not only the shifts in the language of artistic modernity—between the traditional and the experimental, from academic painting to conceptualism—it also interrogates the effects and receptions of modernity by these postcolonial artists in relation to their belonging to the nation.

In doing so, Flores directs attention to a text stenciled on a sculpture by the Malaysian artist Redza Piyadasa, which states that “Artworks never exist in time, they have entry points.” In this text Piyadasa’s sculpture declares the contingency of its own history. In fact, it historicizes its own ambivalence toward canonical epistemology. What the stenciled text seems to be questioning is the idea of art as a universal sign that is frozen historical data. Instead, artworks are dynamic forces that seek out relations of discourse, map new topologies, and create multiple relations and pathways. Piyadasa’s statement anticipates and echoes Bourriaud’s own suggestion for altermodernist art, both in its claim for the trajectories of art but also in the shifting historical and temporal dimension of the apprehension of such art. While none of the four artists whose works were examined in the exhibition have appeared in standard, so-called mainstream surveys and accounts of experimental art and conceptualism of the late 1960s to the present, new off-center historical research such as Flores’s consistently drives us to the harbors of these archipelagos of modernity and contemporary art. The work of Raymundo Albano from the Philippines, Jim Supangkat from Indonesia, Piyadasa, and the younger Thai artist, curator, and art historian Apinan Poshyananda has clear structural affinities with the work of their contemporaries practicing in the West. Yet their work—made with an awareness of and in response to specific historical conditions—shares similar objectives with the work of other postcolonial artists from different parts of the world, including those living and practicing in Europe.
Figure 1. Guy Tillim, *On the Roof of Jeanwell House on Nugget Street*, from the *Joburg* series, 2004. Archival pigment ink on cotton rag paper. Copyright by the artist, courtesy of Michael Stevenson, Cape Town.
Figure 2. Paul Stopforth, *Death of Bantu Steve Biko*, 1980. Mixed media on paper, details in three parts, 22 by 30 inches
Figure 3. Paul Stopforth, *Death of Bantu Steve Biko*, 1980. Mixed media on paper, details in three parts, 22 by 30 inches.
Figure 4. Emily Jacir, *Where We Come From*, 2001–3. Installation, laser prints, chromogenic prints mounted on board, and DVD
Modernity, Postcoloniality, and Sovereign Subjectivity

Whatever the entry point for the altermodern artists, there remain some boundaries between the locations of contemporary artistic practice and the historical production of modern subjectivity. These boundaries are tied up with the unfinished nature of the project of modernity. Consequently, I want to examine in more detail some ideas of modernity that could be related to the way hierarchies operate in the recognition and historicization of artists and their locations of practice. The course followed could be likened to navigating the different levels and segments of grand and petit modernity, albeit with degrees of separation designating stages of development, movements, breaks in cultural logics, ossification of epistemological models, and transitions to which we ascribe the norms of the modern world. One logic of modernity to which the altermodern responds is globalization, a series of processes synonymous with the emergence of a worldwide system of capitalism. We could understand this modernity, in its teleological unfolding, as part of the current manifestation of globalization as a force field of winners, near winners, and losers. (The losers being, obviously, those thoroughly subordinated and utterly disenfranchised by modernity’s centuries-long progression from the worlds of indenture, slavery, imperialism, and colonialism to the aggressive, retributive wars of recent memory.)

This field of retributive conduct has at its disposal the overwhelming capacity to erase and deracinate subjectivities that inhabit the cultural localities of petit modernity. This makes the large claims ascribed to grand modernity less an avatar of enlightened cultural and material transformation and more a structure with a dark core. It seems fairly impossible to think of modernity without linking it to concepts such as sovereignty, equality, and liberty, as they have been developed across domains of life and social practices. Pace Michel Foucault’s theory of biopower,14 many thinkers have focused on this dimension of modernity, a space in which the master-slave dialectic is writ large. This dialectic, developed by G. W. F. Hegel, dissociates sovereignty from the practice of self-governance and instead embeds it in the interrogation of the relations between power and subordination.

Four Modernities

In navigating the different segments of modernity, one could well imagine the different levels of its development or in the hierarchical layers of its con-
struction as the zones of differing concepts of life and death, subject and nonsubject, as the sites of the biopolitical, as the scenes of the struggle of sovereignty, as domains of exception. Here I am employing the segments metaphorically to situate the hierarchies of modernity and in so doing to catch their spillover into domains of everyday practice, crucially, art.

Considering this spillover and following the schema of the hierarchies of modernity, especially as it bears on cultural and artistic practice, I want to conceptualize what I see as the four domains of modernity. The first three domains lay out the architecture for thinking the link between differing zones of life and, indirectly, cultural practice. The fourth and last is skeptical of attributes of modernity as such. It is obvious that when the concept of modernity is broached in recent scholarship, the defining characteristic is overwhelmingly skewed toward the idea of one single modernity, that being the idea that modernity is essentially a project fundamentally connected to the development of Western capitalism and imperialism. Fredric Jameson’s *A Singular Modernity* partly suggests this. In fact, Jameson was brutally skeptical of recent attempts to expand the definitions of modernity into such things as *alternative modernity*, *African modernity*, *subaltern modernity*, or other such designations. To him modernity is inextricably bound to capitalism, and globalization is its current and main feature. But by perceiving all other modernities as flowing from this one single, grand narrative as the fount of historical development, what emerges is a narrower, unifocal, monocultural, and less heterochronical perspective of modernity.

There are four categories that I identify as emblematic of the conditions of modernity today: *supermodernity*, *andromodernity*, *specious modernity*, and *aftermodernity*. For the sake of our focus on visual modernity, my categories may simplify the point. But they will nonetheless serve as points of entry for the photographic images I will reference later.

Supermodernity
Supermodernity, to borrow Marc Augé’s term, postulates the essential forms of modernity through the general character and forms it has taken in European and Western culture. This category of modernity emerges directly from the grand narrative of modernity. Supermodernity represents the idea of the center. It is a domain of power and is often understood as greatly evolved or highly “advanced” or “developed.” It is generally acknowledged as fundamental to the development of the entire framework of global modernity, namely, the world system of capitalism. Therefore, it
is foundational to all other subsequent claims and discourses of modernity. All of them follow in the wake of supermodernity. The main coordinates of supermodernity, as developed through the Enlightenment, are marked by notions such as freedom, progress, rationality, and empiricism. It is through these ideas that the concepts of sovereignty and autonomy emerge.

Understanding the nature of the next two categories requires paying close attention to the four coordinates exemplified in supermodernity, because they are the framing devices that allow us to describe whether a cultural sphere is premodern, modern, or antimodern, insofar as it concerns the world of modernity that we have inherited since the ages of discovery and imperialism. Supermodernity is deeply embedded in structures of power and has at its disposal superior and formidable infrastructures of force to continuously maintain and advance its agenda. More important, it tends to represent our view of modernity in relation to cultural positions and political contexts that may subscribe to the idea of modernity for which Bourriaud has gone searching for new possible artistic imaginaries that deviate from or may even blaspheme its suppositions. For six centuries, supermodernity has been stubbornly resilient and has remained the example to which other modernities respond.

Andromodernity

If supermodernity understands and claims for itself the sole category of the developed and advanced, we can designate the next level—due to historical circumstances, it is imagined as not to have evolved to the same tertiary degree—as developing modernity. It is not difficult to guess which segments of the global order occupy this circle of modernity. Specifically, developing modernity today refers to broad swaths of Asia, especially China, India, South Korea, and so on. In a true sense, this circle of modernity is caught in a cycle that I designate as andromodernity, meaning that it is a hybrid form of modernity, achieved through a kind of accelerated type of development, while also devising alternative models of development. Andromodernity, as such, is a lesser modernity since its principal emphasis is development or modernization, as Jürgen Habermas would have it. Because it is still modernizing, andromodernity has neither the global structure of power nor the infrastructure of economic, technological, political, and epistemological force to promulgate its own agenda independent of the systems (museums, markets, academies) of supermodernity. It therefore lacks, for the moment, the capacity for world dominance. Moreover, much of
its development is seen to be based principally on the affective elements of modernity; that is, they are deeply embedded in the process of modernization, in the way things appear to be modern (hence the obsession with acquiring the accoutrements of a modern society, even if socially there are distinctive differences between various zones of life).

Specious Modernity
This brings us to the next category, which relates to the state of Islamic modernity today. According to some detractors of the rise of political Islam and the extremist strains that have emerged out of the radicalization of politics in Muslim societies, the problem of this rebellion is essentially one of modernity, the idea that these societies have never been modernized. One reason given for this state of affairs within Islam is the lack of democratic participation, which encourages and, in fact, foments authoritarian rule by either the clergy in theocratic Iran, the absolute monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula, or dictatorships such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Bashar al-Assad's Syria. The absence of democratic participation, the argument goes, makes it impossible to bring into existence modernizing forces that would make possible modernity. When it is pointed out that countries such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey have each undergone periods of radical secularization throughout the twentieth century, such instances are often dismissed as superficial attempts at modernization; therefore, what they left in their wake is a kind of specious modernity. Inversely, the long process of reform taking place within Muslim societies today is just as often labeled as a nihilistic, antimodern movement. Whether antimodern or not, it is nevertheless the case that Muslim societies are radicalized, and within that radicalization lies the seed of a biopolitical gesture that is a response to the programs of colonial modernity. Political Islam is thus not a consequence of a specious modernity that never assimilated into its structures an authentic modernity based on the four rationalities of supermodernity, but it is rather a part of a postcolonial form of address seeking new models and political cultures.

The rise of Islamic radicalism throughout the Middle East, the incipient revolution that exploded with the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi and the Peacock Throne in Iran, and with it the sacking and occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by university students unleashed a radical postcolonial force that is distinct from the forces of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. The overthrow of the shah not only revived political Islam, but
it placed it at the center of global discursive formations in which it has remained since the founding of al-Qaeda in the 1990s. Though political Islam was already well financed—both ideologically and intellectually with the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in the 1920s and its intellectual transformation by its chief ideologue Sayyid Qutb—the first demonstration of political Islam’s will to globality was the theocratic organization of its power in Iran in 1979. The Iranian Revolution signaled the changed context of superpower politics. It not only introduced a new actor on the ideological landscape—an actor who decides on the limits of life and controls and mobilizes the organizations of death—but it also imagined a new political community separate from and permanently antagonistic to structures of power and infrastructures of force specific to supermodernity. As such, the early 1980s inaugurated a remarkable cultural and political shift in global terms.

The signal event of this historical shift was the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to Tehran from exile in Paris after the triumph of the resistance against the shah. As the spiritual leader of the Islamic theocracy that has governed Iran to date, Khomeini presided over the radical ideological repositioning of Iran away from the epistemological and cultural dominance of the West to Islamic ethics, not only as a system of governance but as a worldview based on the Koran as the supreme tool of religious, political, cultural, social, and economic conduct and identity. The Iranian Revolution was not just an act of insurrection against supermodernity, attacking the dominant assumptions of imperialism that accompany it; the revolution posited itself as an instrument of spiritual and therefore social and cultural purification from the stain of Western, godless decadence. In the end the revolution, though “political” in the pedestrian sense, was in fact about culture and identity: Islamic modernity as a countermodel and real alternative to modernity. This position of political Islam is in remarkable accord with the idea of the altermodern.

Thus, the test for the power of persuasion of supermodernity can be partly analyzed through the sanguine postcolonial lessons of the Iranian Revolution and the various struggles, for better or worse, that have been undertaken by social and political forces radicalized by their resentment of the machinations of the West in Muslim societies. Structuring this radicalization, and all the splintered cultural ideas and ideologies that rise from it, is the collision of two irreconcilable positions: on the one hand, a Western ethnocentric exceptionalism that continues to prescribe a civilizing
ethos for the Muslim world and, on the other, an Islamic fundamentalism that mercilessly attacks the West and its allies with nihilistic violence. This meeting is a collision of political forces and cultural logics, an altermodernist relation marked by a face-off between colonial modernity and postcolonial modernity. However, the distance between colonial modernity and postcolonial modernity is one of degrees, for each incorporates and contradicts the other; each is the mirror of the other. Their strained interpretation of the other is what has produced the kind of cultural antagonism that currently bedevils Western and postcolonial discursive formations, further encraving the competing institutional structures, epistemology, ideals, faith, and identity.

Aftermodernity
So far, we have addressed the three dominant ideas of current thinking about modernity. The fourth concerns an area of the world, Africa, seen to be the most opaque to the persuasions of supermodernity. Africa is located in the nethermost part of modernity, relegated to an epistemology of non-existence that has never been modern, to literalize Bruno Latour’s idea. Africa shares part of the scorn about its nonmodernity that is also directed at the Muslim world. But Islamic societies do enjoy greater respect than Africa because there is a classical Islamic past that Africa is said to lack. Hegel made this explicit when he wrote: “Africa proper, as far as History goes back, has remained—for all purposes of connection with the rest of the world—shut up; it is the Gold land compressed within itself—the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of Night. Its isolated character originated, not merely in its tropical nature, but essentially in its geographical condition.”
If Africa is no part of historical consciousness, thereby lacking “Spirit,” how can it lay claim to any experience of modernity if not from an education derived from the master narrative of grand modernity? If the Muslim world is speciously modern and Africa not yet modern, then the two societies exist in antirational systems of theocratic fundamentalism or tribal ethnocentrism. Each of these societies is reduced to cultural spheres whose experience of modernity has been developed out of oppression and violence and therefore in need of reconciling to modernity. However, Islamic societies tend to fare better than African ones in debates around modernity. Africa is a zone that many reflexively and categorically declare as the antithesis of the modern imagination, the absence of modernity, where every aspect of
the conditions of living specific to modernity has been effaced or erased. By this thinking, Africa is the true epigone of modernity. If Bourriaud posits the entire structure of his project as altermodernist, Africa, it may be said, at the very least is aftermodern not only because the narratives of modernity in Africa are predicated on an encounter of antagonism but also in the invention of a new African character of modernity that emerges after the end of modernity. The modernity to which Africa responds, and which it struggles to disaggregate from its social context, is the architecture of colonial modernity. It is in this sense that situations of modernity in Africa are aftermodern because, having no relation to history making, its modernity can emerge only after the end of the modern. Such modernity, more than in other parts of world, would be based in large part on a project of disinherit the violence of colonial modernity.

This is partly what the recent images produced by South African photographer Guy Tillim seem to suggest: parts of Africa—Congo, Angola, Madagascar, Ghana, and Mozambique—have undertaken inconclusive projects of modernization. Tillim’s photographs depict processes of anomic. Viewed through a conventional lens, these images tend to convey and confirm the idea that modernization has been marked by failure in Africa. To a large extent, the images are products of a certain ethnography of modernity, in the same way that my perception of European cities evokes the spectral nature of a museum of petrified modernity.

Tillim has been photographing in Africa for more than a decade now. His images can be superficially described as reportage, a mode of photographic production that can either oversimplify complex situations or may illuminate aspects of such situations as worthy of examination. Working with the verve of a photojournalist and an aid worker, Tillim has carefully inserted himself and his camera into spaces that would be out-of-bounds for most photographers. He has made various African cities the haunt of his photographic enterprise, for instance photographing over a period of six months in the tough tenements of Johannesburg, in modernist buildings that have entered a state of ruin as the urban context of the postapartheid city became replaced by a sense of siege. Likewise, Tillim has roamed all over Africa, to various regions of conflict, searching or, as some would say, scavenging for images of societies in near-collapse. On first encountering many of Tillim’s images, the tendency is to view his photographs as the work of a zealous sensationalist or an ethnographer inscribing fantasies of a visual frisson against the backdrop of social collapse.
The recent series of work by Tillim, like his Jo'burg series, initially gave me pause, but looking more carefully at the selection of scenes and the organization of the larger compendium, the logic of his approach revealed a study of contrasts between postcolonial state failure in Africa and the notion of a continent in the throes of entering aftermodern. It is the intersection between these contrasts, the promise and failure of decolonization, and the slow process of a countermoderenity that is about to take root in Africa. Tillim summarizes this vision of a yet-to-come modernity, writing about his images: “These photographs are not collapsed histories of post-colonial African states or a meditation on aspects of late modernist era colonial structures, but a walk through avenues of dreams. Patrice Lumumba’s dream, his nationalism, is discernible in the structures, if one reads the signs, as is the death of his dream, in these de facto monuments. How strange that modernism, which eschewed monument and past for nature and future, should carry such memory so well.”

Throughout different parts of Africa, new discourses and patterns of modernization are not only rethinking the entire agenda that colonial modernity bequeathed the continent, but social scientists and researchers have also been articulating possible theories for a type of modernity and a structure of modernization that can take hold in Africa. This modernity, it is hoped, will emerge at the end of the project of supermodernity. It will perhaps mark not only an ideal of the altermodern but will initiate a new cycle of the aftermodern.

Tillim succinctly articulates that spirit of the yet-to-come: “In the frailty of this strange and beautiful hybrid landscape struggling to contain the calamities of the past fifty years, there is an indisputably African identity. This is my embrace of it.” His photographic project is an expression of the hope that showing the decaying legacy of colonial modernity in Africa is not an attempt to mourn the loss of some great past but a possible tabula rasa for a future composition. It disarms and dispossesses the colonial inheritance and shows, as Habermas argues, that modernity is an incomplete project.

Notes


The New York Times architecture critic Nicolai Ouroussoff recently wrote a series of articles on the changes taking place in Beijing, paying particular attention to how new developments are rapidly remaking and recomposing the historical character of the city, especially with the demolition of large swaths of traditional Hutong (courtyard) houses that were part of the city's architectural heritage. See Nicolai Ouroussoff, "Lost in the New Beijing: The Old Neighborhood," New York Times, July 23, 2008; and Nicolai Ouroussoff, "In Changing Face of Beijing, a Look at the New China," New York Times, July 13, 2008. In a comparative analysis of China and Persian Gulf cities such as Dubai, Ouroussoff explores how the idea of modernization on a massive scale has shifted visionary architecture that, in the past, was largely viewed skeptically by architects and was, for the most part, peripheral to new theories of urbanism. With the advent of these changes in China and in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Doha, and so on, the new frontier of urban experimentation has moved to the East and declined in the West. See Nicolai Ouroussoff, "The New, New City," New York Times, June 8, 2008.

In a commentary about the intention of the work, Huang Yong Ping says, "In China, regarding the two cultures of East and West, traditional and modern, it is constantly being discussed as to which is right, which is wrong, and how to blend the two. In my opinion, placing these two texts in the washing machine for two minutes symbolizes this situation and well solves the problem much more effectively and appropriately than debates lasting a hundred years." Quoted in Gao Minglu, The Wall: Redefining Contemporary Chinese Art (Buffalo, NY: Albright Knox Art Gallery, 2005), 129.


In 2001, the first African pavilion in the Venice Biennale in the exhibition Authentic/Excentric, curated by Salah Hassan and Olu Oguibe, argued for this sense of a dispersed zone of practice. For a productive curatorial and critical exploration of the idea of the eccentric nature of the contemporary, see the accompanying catalog, Salah Hassan and Olu Oguibe, eds., Authentic/Ex-centric: Conceptualism in Contemporary African Art (Ithaca, NY: Forum for African Arts, 2001).

Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 4.

Nicolas Bourriaud, statement in a brochure outlining the Altermodern program (Tate Britain, London, April 2008).


The four artists in the exhibition were Raymundo Albano (Philippines), Redza Piyadasa (Malaysia), Jim Supangkat (Indonesia), and Apinan Poshyananda (Thailand). All played multiple roles as influential artists, curators, critics, and historians in each of their individual national contexts in the development of the discourses of modernity and contemporary art.


These objectives would be familiar to emerging scholars such as Sunanda Sanyal, whose research focuses on modernism in Uganda; Elizabeth Harney, who has written extensively about Negritude and modernism in Senegal; or the magisterial writing on mod-

These surveys and situations of off-centeredness are emblematic of the large historical gaps that today, in the era of globalization, need to be reconciled with dominant paradigms of artistic discourse. In seeking to historicize these contexts of production and practice, a dialogic system of evaluation is established. It resolutely veers away from the standard and received notions of modernity, especially in the hierarchical segmentations that have been the prevailing point of entry into its review of off-center practices.


15 Subordination is directly linked to how power exposes the subordinate to structures of violence, to acts of historical erasure. In this area of analysis, Giorgio Agamben's exten-
sion of biopower and biopolitics was an attempt to sketch out the conditions around which what he calls *naked life* or *bare life* is summoned: a state of living in which individual sovereignty is exposed to its most basic, barest dimension, to execution. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). In terms of ideas surrounding modernity and colonialism, this thinking has been singularly illuminating and has been taken up by other thinkers. The feminist literary scholar Judith Butler, for example, in a recent reflection on the prosecution of the war on terror and the hopelessness of prisoners caught in its principal noose place, Guantánamo Bay, addresses the issue of naked life in the essay "Precarious Life." Judith Butler, "Precarious Life," in *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004), 128–51.

Pushing further the frontier of this thinking is the powerful writing of theorist Achille Mbembe, especially in an essay in which he summarizes the dimensions of biopower, bare, and precarious life as the zone of *necropolitics* (Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby McIntyre, *Public Culture* 15.1 [Winter 2003]: 11–40). In the essay, Mbembe explores the fundamental relationship between modernity and violence, particularly in the apparatuses of the colonial regime, such that "To exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power" (ibid., 13). For Mbembe, necropolitics is the condition under which conducts related to sovereignty—as he amply demonstrates with the policy of apartheid in South Africa or the predicament of the Palestinians in the occupied territories—are inextricably bound up with exercises of control over existence, of individual lives, and their narratives. Most examinations of the artistic work coming out of South Africa during the apartheid era confirm how artists were overwhelmingly preoccupied with the structures of violence and its direct manifestation as part of the condition of colonial modernity and thereby establish art as one exploration of the question of sovereignty. Here, resistance to violence and the rigorous assertion of sovereign subjectivity become in themselves the subject and narrative of art and cultural production.

Facing away from culture, Mbembe in his critique, for example, sees political theory as tending to associate sovereignty with issues of autonomy, be it that of the state or of the individual. He argues: "The romance of sovereignty, in this case, rests on the belief that the subject is the master and the controlling author of his or her own meaning. Sovereignty is therefore defined as a twofold process of self-institution and self-limitation (fixing one's own limits for oneself). The exercise of sovereignty, in turn, consists in society's capacity for self-creation through recourse to institutions inspired by specific social and imaginary significations" (ibid., 13). To distinguish this relation of self-institution and self-limitation, the central concern he notes targets instead "those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations" (ibid., 14). Two of Mbembe's historical examples are South Africa and Palestine. In the fate of these two spaces, he identifies the fundamental rationality of modernity, arguing, "that modernity was at the origin of multiple concepts of sovereignty—and therefore of the biopolitical" (ibid., 13). Artworks such as those by William Kentridge, in films such as *Ubu Tells the Truth* (1957), and Paul Stopforth, in his 1980 drawing series *Death of Steve Biko*, to name only two instances from South Africa and by Emily Jacir in her exhibition.
Where We Come From (2003) all form part of the artistic responses to the concepts of sovereignty and the biopolitical.

It strikes me that the idea of the altermodern, as it deviates from the limits placed on life and subjectivity by the instrumental violence of modernity, cannot be captured by focusing alone on shifts in locales of practice or by strategies of resistance against domination. The altermodern is to be found in the work of art itself, the work of art as a manifestation of pure difference in all the social, cultural, and political signs it wields to elaborate that difference. It is the space in which to fulfill the radical gesture of refusal and disobedience, not in the formal sense, but in the ethical and epistemological sense. Such stances, of what I take to be altermodern, with their difference writ large as the fundamental quest of the object of art, can be identified in such diverse works as the installations of Thomas Hirschhorn, the radiant paintings of Chris Ofili, the splayed anatomies of Marlene Dumas, the paintings on animal sacrifice as a metaphor for human suffering by Iba N'Diaye, the 2008 film Hunger by Steve McQueen, and many more.

19 The Iranian Revolution marked a shift from the modern politics of Gamel Abdel Nasser's pan-Arabism.
22 Guy Tillim, e-mail message to author, September 25, 2008.
23 Ibid.
24 Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.